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Abstract
Part I traces the evolution of Ethiopia’s constitutional human rights guarantees in each of
the country’s constitutional manifestations from the period of Emperor Haile Selassie’s reign to
the present. Part II explores the status of fundamental rights and freedoms in Ethiopia’s 1995
FDRE Constitution. Part III describes the players and processes of Ethiopia’s complex system of
non-judicial constitutional review, including the dominant role played by the HOF and Council
of Constitutional Inquiry and the marginalized role of the courts. Part IV presents a comparative
analysis of countries engaged in non-judicial constitutional review, including China, the former
Soviet Union, and Finland. Part V explores the practical implications of non-judicial constitutional
review on the enforcement of human rights in Ethiopia. It argues that the HOF lacks independence
from the executive and thus cannot be trusted to adjudicate sensitive political matters involving the
Constitution in an unbiased manner. This Part also argues that Ethiopia’s system of non-judicial
constitutional review weakens the judiciary’s power to check the constitutional excesses of the
other branches of government; may fail to protect the rights of minority groups in constitutional
disputes due to the majoritarian make-up of the House of Federation; and perpetuates an inefficient
system that precludes access to justice. Part VI calls for constitutional and judicial reforms that
will result in an independent, organized, and efficient system of judicial review in Ethiopia.
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INTRODUCTION
The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia ("FDRE") provides broad human rights protections
in conformity with international human rights laws and princi-
ples. Nonetheless, the House of Federation ("HOF"), a parlia-
mentary political organ that represents the political interests of
Ethiopia's ethnic groups, is mandated to interpret the Constitu-
tion at the exclusion of the judiciary. This Report culminates a
semester-long project undertaken by the Walter Leitner Interna-
tional Human Rights Clinic at Fordham Law School, in partner-
ship with faculty and students at Ethiopia's Addis Ababa Univer-
sity Faculty of Law, to study Ethiopia's system of non-judicial con-
stitutional review and to investigate its impact on the protection
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of fundamental human rights and freedoms. While in Ethiopia,
the Leitner Clinic-Addis Ababa Law School delegation met with
Ethiopian lawyers, judges, human rights defenders, constitu-
tional law scholars, and representatives from the Ministry of Jus-
tice, HOF, and Prime Minister's Office. This Report presents
the findings of this research effort.
The list of enumerated fundamental rights and freedoms in
the Ethiopian FDRE Constitution is progressive and impressive.'
The question, however, is whether there exist strong and compe-
tent institutions to protect and enforce these rights.2 One of the
most crucial institutions in the protection of human rights
should be the judiciary.3 Yet, when a constitutional dispute
arises in Ethiopia courts must forward the case to the HOF for
adjudication.4 In Article 13(1), the Constitution states that the
judiciary has the duty to enforce the fundamental rights and
freedoms in the Constitution.5 However, the judiciary has been
1. See RAKEB MESSELE, ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ETHIOPIA 15 (2002),
available at http://www.apapeth.org/Docs/ENFORCEMENT%200F%20HR.pdf; Inter-
view with Fasil Nahum, Senior Legal Adviser to the Prime Minister, in Addis Ababa, Eth.
(Apr. 7, 2008); see also Nicole B. Herther-Spiro, Can Ethnic Federalism Prevent "Recourse to
Rebellion?" A Comparative Analysis of the Ethiopian and Iraqi Constitutional Structures, 21
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 321, 345-48, 354-55 (2007); T.S. Twibell, Ethiopian Constitutional
Law: The Structure of the Ethiopian Government and the New Constitution's Ability to Overcome
Ethiopia's Problems, 21 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 399, 409, 418-21, 424-31, 438-46,
448-49 (1999). But see Minasse Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact upon
Unity, Human Rights and Development, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 1, 46 (1996) [here-
inafter Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution] (arguing that the Constitution's creation
of a powerful federal government undermines any rights it confers); Minasse Haile,
Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions: The Emperor's and the "Repub-
lic's"-Cucullus Non Facit Monachum, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 30-32 (2005)
[hereinafter Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions] (noting that
the Constitution suspends basic human rights in times of national emergency); Ale-
mante G. Selassie, Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa, 28 YALE J. INT'L L.
51, 93-96 (2003) (arguing that the Constitution's support of ethnic federalism militates
against the concept of human rights).
2. See Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1, at
26-32; Messele, supra note 1, at 15-16; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; see also
Elena A. Baylis, Beyond Rights: Legal Process and Ethnic Conflicts, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 529,
548-62 (2004); Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 46; Herther-Spiro,
supra note 1, at 337-38, 350-52, 354-55, 364-67; Kimberly Medlock Wigger, Ethiopia: A
Dichotomy of Despair and Hope, 5 TuLSA J. CoMP. & I'r'L L. 389, 399-401 (1998);James
C.N. Paul, Human Rights and the Structure of Security Forces in Constitutional Orders: The
Case of Ethiopia, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 235, 239, 246-56 (1994); Twibell, supra note
1, at 418-21, 424-31, 438-46, 448-49.
3. See Messele, supra note 1, at 15-16.
4. ETH. CoNsT. art. 84 § 2.
5. Id. art. 13 § 1; see Messele, supra note 1, at 23.
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stripped of one of its most powerful tools in guarding against the
infringement of constitutionally guaranteed human rights-the
power of judicial review.6
Part I traces the evolution of Ethiopia's constitutional
human rights guarantees in each of the country's constitutional
manifestations from the period of Emperor Haile Selassie's
reign to the present. Part II explores the status of fundamental
rights and freedoms in Ethiopia's 1995 FDRE Constitution. Part
III describes the players and processes of Ethiopia's complex sys-
tem of non-judicial constitutional review, including the domi-
nant role played by the HOF and Council of Constitutional In-
quiry and the marginalized role of the courts. Part IV presents a
comparative analysis of countries engaged in non-judicial consti-
tutional review, including China, the former Soviet Union, and
Finland. Part V explores the practical implications of non-judi-
cial constitutional review on the enforcement of human rights in
Ethiopia. It argues that the HOF lacks independence from the
executive and thus cannot be trusted to adjudicate sensitive po-
litical matters involving the Constitution in an unbiased manner.
This Part also argues that Ethiopia's system of non-judicial con-
stitutional review weakens thejudiciary's power to check the con-
stitutional excesses of the other branches of government; may
fail to protect the rights of minority groups in constitutional dis-
putes due to the majoritarian make-up of the House of Federa-
tion; and perpetuates an inefficient system that precludes access
to justice. Part VI calls for constitutional and judicial reforms
that will result in an independent, organized, and efficient sys-
tem of judicial review in Ethiopia.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES DURING ETHIOPIA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL ERAS
Ethiopia's modern constitutional eras have presented
unique human rights challenges.7 Emperor Haile Selassie I as-
6. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 54-59.
7. Ethiopia is an amalgamation of approximately eight)' disparate and distinct eth-
nic groups that speak approximately eighty different languages and adhere to many
different faiths, including Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Animism. See Selassie, supra
note 1, at 61; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; see alsoJulie Macfarlane, Working
Towards Restorative Justice in Ethiopia: Integrating Traditional Conflict Resolution Systems with
the Formal Legal System, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLIcr RESOL. 487, 498-99 (2007); Aaron P.
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cended the throne in 1930.8 Selassie enacted two Constitutions
during his reign.9 Ethiopia's first Constitution came into force
in 1931,10 and a revised Constitution was adopted in 1955."1
Both the 1931 and 1955 Constitutions codified the unlimited
and inalienable power of the sovereign over his subjects and in-
cluded few, if any, human rights protections.' 2 The slow pace
and limited nature of Emperor Selassie's political and economic
reforms led to an attempted coup in 1960." Selassie was blamed
for failing to acknowledge and alleviate the suffering of Ethiopi-
ans perishing due to drought and famine.' 4
The Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police,
and Territorial Army, or the Derg as it was commonly known,
was a pan-military dictatorship with communist aspirations,
which overthrew Emperor Selassie in a "creeping coup," result-
ing in Selassie's imprisonment in 1974 and death in 1975.15 In
the months prior to Selassie's arrest, the government prepared a
draft of a revised Constitution, in an apparent attempt to placate
the Derg. 6 This draft Constitution attempted to form a consti-
tutional monarchy. 17 The draft Constitution, however, was never
adopted. 8
Upon assuming control, the Derg immediately suspended
Micheau, The 1991 Transitional Charter of Ethiopia: A New Application of the Self-Determina-
tion Principle?, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 367, 380-81 (1996).
8. MatthewJ. McCracken, Abusing Self-Determination and Democracy: How the TPLF is
Looting Ethiopia, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 183, 189 (2004).
9. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 392, 394; John W. Van Doren, Positivism and the Rule
of Law, Formal Systems or Concealed Values: A Case Study of the Ethiopian Legal System, 3J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 165, 184-86 (1994).
10. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 394; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 184-86.
11. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 394; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 184-86.
12. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 394; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 184-86.
13. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COUNTRY STUDIES, A COUN-
TRY STUDY: ETHIOPIA (2005), http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html, at The Attempted
Coup of 1960 and Its Aftermath, http://cweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@
field(DOCID+et0038) [hereinafter ETHIOPIA COUNTRY STUDY].
14. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 394-95.
15. See Kemal Bedri & Elena Baylis, Constructing Credibility, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 399,
399 (2003); Derege Demissie, Self-Determination Including Secession vs. the Territorial Integ-
rity of Nation-States: A Prima Facie Case for Secession, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 165,
181 (1996); McCracken, supra note 8, at 190; Wigger, supra note 2, at 397; Micheau,
supra note 7, at 375; Paul, supra note 2, at 239; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 169-70.
16. See ETHIOPIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 13, at The Establishment of the Derg,
http://Icweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+t038).
17. See id.
18. See id.
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the revised 1955 Constitution' 9 and systematically eradicated all
dissent.2 ° The Derg carried out arbitrary arrests and detentions,
torture, and extrajudicial executions of political opponents and
opposition elements. 21  Major Mengistu Haile Marium main-
tained tight control of the Derg22 while Ethiopia operated with-
out a constitution for twelve years. 23
The Derg established the Constitution of the People's Dem-
ocratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1987.24 The Constitution, which
purported to espouse a commitment to basic freedoms and
rights, was belied by the Derg's massive human rights viola-
tions.
25
During the Derg's reign, the combination of drought, cor-
ruption, mismanagement, and the forced resettlement of 1.5
million Ethiopians led to widespread famine and impoverish-
ment.26 Internal and external military operations, including in-
ternal insurgencies in Tigray and Eritrea, as well as Somalia's at-
tempted annexation of the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, contrib-
uted to the virtual bankruptcy of the government. 27 As a result,
the Tigray People's Liberation Front ("TPLF") joined with other
ethnic groups to form the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front ("EPRDF"), which, together with the Eritrean
People's Liberation Front ("EPLF"), brought about the demise
of the Derg on May 28, 1991, Ethiopia's National Day.28
The EPRDF established the Transitional Government of
Ethiopia ("TGE"), headed by TPLF leader Meles Zenawi, as well
as a transitional charter that included important human rights
19. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 397; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 170, 186.
20. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 334-35; McCracken, supra note 8, at 190-92;
Wigger, supra note 2, at 398.
21. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 334-35; McCracken, supra note 8, at 190-92;
Wigger, supra note 2, at 398; Paul, supra note 2, at 244.
22. See McCracken, supra note 8, at 189-90; Wigger, supra note 2, at 397-98; Paul,
supra note 2, at 240; Van Doren, supra note 8, at 169-70.
23. See Van Doren, supra note 9, at 169-70, 186.
24. See id. at 186.
25. See ETHIOPIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 13, at Citizenship, Freedoms, Rights, and
Duties, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+etO130).
26. See Wigger, supra note 2, at 397-99.
27. See McCracken, supra note 8, at 190-92.
28. See Baylis, supra note 2, at 568; Demissie, supra note 15, at 181; McCracken,
supra note 8, at 183-84, 190-92; Richard A. Rosen, Constitutional Process, Constitutionalism,
and the Eritrean Experience, 24 N.C.J. Int'l & Com. Reg. 263, 273 (1999); Selassie, supra
note 1, at 63; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 170; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1.
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provisions. 29 The transitional charter fully recognized freedom
of speech and the press." The charter also established the
group right to self-determination," 1 which led the Oromo Liber-
ation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front to mount
insurgencies3 2 and Eritrea to vote to secede in 1993.
31
Under the EPRDF's provisional government, dominated by
the TPLF, the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia (the FDRE Constitution) was adopted in 1994 and
came into force in 1995.14  The EPRDF comprised approxi-
mately eighty-five percent of the Constitutional Assembly which
enacted the Constitution. 35 The 1995 FDRE Constitution is Ethi-
opia's most progressive and comprehensive Constitution in
terms of fundamental rights and freedoms. 36 One-third of the
Constitution is devoted to the recognition and protection of
human rights.37  It also establishes human rights institutions,
such as an Ombudsman and a Human Rights Commission. In
addition to individual human rights, the Constitution espouses a
commitment to ethnic group rights.39
The FDRE Constitution is anchored by the concept of eth-
29. See Anonymous, Human Rights in the Horn of Africa, 11 IND. INT'L & CoMp. L.
REV. 543, 548-52 (2001); Bedri & Baylis, supra note 15, at 399; Herther-Spiro, supra note
1, at 335; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 190-92; Van Doren, supra note 9, at 170,
187.
30. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 8.
31. See Hum. Rts. Watch, Eritrea & Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa War: Mass Ex-
pulsions and the Nationality Issue 12 (Jan. 2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
ethioeritOlO3/ethioerit03.pdf.
32. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 365; McCracken, supra note 8, at 198-201;
Selassie, supra note 1, at 84.
33. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 335; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183, 191-
92; Wigger, supra note 2, at 399; Rosen, supra note 28, at 273.
34. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 9; Herther-Spiro, supra
note 1, at 335; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-93; Wigger, supra note 2, at 399.
35. See Anonymous, supra note 29, at 549. The opposing political parties refused
to participate in Constitutional Assembly elections because they had been excluded
from participating in the drafting of the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
("FDRE") Constitution. See id.; Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 9.
The Oromo, Ethiopia's largest ethnic group which comprised 40% of the population,
left the transitional government and had no hand in writing Ethiopia's Constitution. See
Baylis, supra note 2 at 547, 550.
36. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 345-47; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84;
Twibell, supra note 1, at 399-409, 438-46.
37. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 53; see also Twibell,
supra note 1, at 439 & n.296 (stating half).
38. ETH. CoNsT. art. 55 §§ 14-15; see Twibell, supra note 1, at 443.
39. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 54-55, 64-68; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra
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nic federalism, which constitutionalizes Ethiopia's ethnic diver-
sity and recognizes the various ethnic groups as units of self-gov-
ernment, or "Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples" ("NN&P"),
with powers to secede or form their own states within the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.4 ° According to the 1995
FDRE Constitution, sovereignty rests not with the people or indi-
vidual citizens of Ethiopia, but with the NN&P of Ethiopia.4 1
The Constitutional Assembly's ostensible reasoning for con-
stitutionalizing ethnic federalism was its desire to maintain Ethi-
opia's unity while ensuring equality among Ethiopia's various
ethnic groups and providing a political mechanism for dissipat-
ing ethnic tensions.42 There are advantages and disadvantages
to ethnic federalism. 43 Some argue that a federal government
with constitutional recognition of both ethnic group diversity
and equality not only allows for national integration and politi-
cal legitimacy but provides a political framework for harmonious
co-existence.44 Others argue that such an emphasis on ethnic
divisions, along with an easy means of secession, only entrenches
the psychological barriers that separate ethnic groups.4 5 While
note 1; see also Demissie, supra note 15, at 183; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 332-33,
345-48; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-94.
40. ETH. CONST. pmbl., art. 39; see Baylis, supra note 2, at 558; Herther-Spiro, supra
note 1, at 323, 345-48. The Federation currently consists of nine states, which aim to
broadly and roughly represent the delineations between ethnic groups in Ethiopia.
The Constitution describes a Nation, Nationality, or People as a group of persons with a
common culture, a common language, a predominantly contiguous territory, a com-
mon identity, and a common psychological make-up. ETH. CONST. art. 39 § 5; see Selas-
sie, supra note 1, at 54-55, 58-59, 61, 63-68; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; see
also McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 193.
41. ETH. CONST. pmbl; see Selassie, supra note 1, at 54-55, 63-68; Interview with Fasil
Nahum, supra note 1; see also Baylis, supra note 2, at 560; Demissie, supra note 15, at 183;
Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 345-48; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 193; Makau
Wa Mutua, The Politics of Human Rights: Beyond the Abolitionist Paradigm in Africa, 17
MICH. J. INT'L L. 591, 603-04, 611-12 (1996).
42. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 63-68; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; see
also Baylis, supra note 2, at 548-61; Demissie, supra note 15, at 181-83; Herther-Spiro,
supra note 1, at 329-32, 345, 348; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-93; Mutua,
supra note 41, at 603-04, 611-12.
43. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 53-55, 63-68; see also Baylis, supra note 2, at 548-56,
558-59; Demissie, supra note 15, at 181-83; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 329-32, 345;
Wigger, supra note 2, at 401.
44. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 53-55, 64-68; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra
note 1; see also Demissie, supra note 15, at 181-83; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 329-32,
345, 348; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-93; Mutua, supra note 41, at 603-04,
611-12.
45. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 53; see also Baylis, supra note 2, at 548-56, 558-59;
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Ethiopia's ethnic groups are arranged in a somewhat geographi-
cal pattern, espouse varying religious beliefs, and speak separate
languages, intermarriage and the transference of cultural prac-
tices over centuries and millennia have eradicated most ethnic
differences.46 Yet, these emotional ties to community foster a
deep and inveterate identity with one's ethnic group.4 7
In addition to the constitutionalization of ethnic federalism,
the other hallmark of the 1995 FDRE Constitution is the vast
array of rights it espouses, including both individual human
rights and ethnic group rights. 4  Chapter III of the FDRE Con-
stitution includes a detailed and comprehensive list of enumer-
ated fundamental rights and freedoms, including human rights
and democratic rights.49 These rights and freedoms include the
right to life; security of person; liberty; protections against arbi-
trary arrest and detention; the right to trial; equality before the
law; and privacy. 50 Additionally, Chapter III of the Constitution
includes prohibitions against a number of forms of discrimina-
tion, as well as protections for freedom of religion, belief, and
opinion.51 The enumerated democratic rights include freedom
of expression, assembly, association, and movement. 52 Article 39
includes the right of secession for any NN&P of Ethiopia.53 Arti-
cle 41 enumerates economic, social and cultural rights. 54 Article
Demissie, supra note 15, at 181-83; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 329-32, 348; Mc-
Cracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-93; Wigger, supra note 2, at 401; Mutua, supra note
41, at 603-04, 611-12; Jerome Wilson, Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-Determination, 11
CONN. J. INT'L L. 433, 484 (1996).
46. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 59; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 333.
47. See Selassie, supra note 1, at 59.
48. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 53-54; Interview with
Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; see also Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 345-48; McCracken,
supra note 8, at 195; Twibell, supra note 1, at 399409, 424-31, 438-46.
49. ETH. CONST. ch. 3; see Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; see also
Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 345-48; McCracken, supra note 8, at 195; Twibell, sujira
note 1, at 438-46. But see Twibell, supra note 1, at 425-28, 438-46 (discussing the down-
falls of specifically enumerating these rights).
50. ETH. CONsT. arts. 14-17, 19-20, 25-26; see also Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitu-
tion, supra note 1, at 53.
51. ETH. CONST. arts. 25, 27, 38; see also Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra
note 1, at 53; McCracken, supra note 8, at 195; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1.
52. ETH. CONST. arts. 29-32; see Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1,
at 53; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 345-48; McCracken, supra note 8, at 195.
53. ETH. CONs-r. art. 39; see Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 34548; McCracken,
supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-93, 195.
54. ETH. CONST. art. 41; see generally Rakeb Messele, supra note 1, at 28-36.
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44 addresses environmental rights.55
The 1995 FDRE Constitution also embraces a system of non-
judicial constitutional review. The Constitutional Assembly had
originally proposed a constitutional court which would have had
the power to review the constitutionality of parliamentary and
executive action. 56 In fact, the Ethiopian Constitution still con-
tains an empty provision directing the HOF to establish a Consti-
tutional Court.57 However, at a certain point during the draft-
ing, the framers decided that the court should become an advi-
sory committee, and the HOF should have the power of
constitutional interpretation.58
According to scholars, constitutional drafters, legal experts,
and judges, the Constitutional Assembly opted to have the HOF
interpret the Constitution rather than the judiciary for several
reasons. The first reason has its roots in ethnic federalism. 59
The framers viewed the Constitution as "a political contract,"
among the NN&P and therefore believed it is only representa-
tives of the ethnic groups who have the power to interpret the
contract."0 The logic is that since the NN&P created the govern-
ment to represent their interests, those groups alone should re-
tain the power of constitutional interpretation.6 ' The framers
took what they saw as a political power, and vested it in a political
body, the HOF, charged with representing the interests of the
55. ETH. CONST. art. 44. But see Twibell, supra note 1, at 443 (deriding this provi-
sion as "fashionable").
56. See Interview with Getahun Kassa, Expert on the Council of Constitutional In-
quiry, in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Mar. 25, 2008); see also Interview with Assefa Fiseha, Profes-
sor of Law, Addis Ababa University Faculty of Law, in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Mar. 25,
2008); Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1.
57. ETH. CONST. art. 62(2).
58. See Interview with Getahun Kassa, supra note 56; see also Interview with Assefa
Fiseha, supra note 56; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; Interview with Tilahun
Teshome, Professor of Law, Addis Ababa University Faculty of Law, in Addis Ababa,
Eth. (Mar. 27, 2008).
59. See Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and the Adjudication of Constitutional Issues: The Ethi-
opian Experience, 52 NETH. IN-r'L L. REv. 1, 4 n.7 (2005) [hereinafter Federalism and Adju-
dication]; Interview with Getahun Kassa, supra note 56; Interview with Fasil Nahum,
supra note 1.
60. See Interview with Assefa Fiseha, supra note 56; Interview with Anonymous,
High Court Judge, in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Mar. 26, 2008).
61. See Federalism and Adjudication, supra note 59, at 16; Interview with Assefa
Fiseha, supra note 56; Interview with Getahun Kassa, supra note 56; Interview with Fasil
Nahum, supra note 1 ("They say it is our constitution, therefore, it is we who should
interpret it.").
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NN&P.62
The Constitutional Assembly may have also feared 'judicial
activism" or creation of a 'judicial dictatorship" that would over-
ride the will of the NN&P if the judiciary were charged with con-
stitutional interpretation.6 3 In addition, some argue that the
Ethiopian people did not trust the judiciary because centralized
executive power under Selassie and the Derg had stunted the
development of a well-functioning judiciary capable of con-
ducting judicial review.64 The framers seemed to assume (and
one might argue desire) that the judiciary would remain the
weakest branch of the government.
Despite the establishment of the new government and Con-
stitution after the toppling of the Derg, the EPRDF ruling party
has been the target of criticism for its human rights record.65 In
May 2005, parliamentary elections were held in which major op-
position parties participated, and voter turnout was high.66 Im-
mediately following the elections, the opposition parties accused
the EPRDF of tampering with the election results.67 Prime Min-
ister Meles Zenawi banned all demonstrations, but protests oc-
curred nonetheless.68 In June 2005, 9000 supporters of the lead-
ing opposition party, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy
("CUD"), many of whom were students, were arrested.6 9 Human
rights advocates, lawyers, academics, and journalists were also
62. See, e.g., FASIL NAHUM, CONSTITUTION FOR A NATION OF NATIONS: THE ETHIO-
PIAN PROSPECT 74 (1997) [hereinafter THE ETHIOPIAN PROSPECT]; Interview with Assefa
Fiseha, supra note 56; Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1; Interview with Eshetu
W. Semayat, Ministry of Justice Official, in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Mar. 26, 2008).
63. See Interview with Assefa Fiseha, supra note 56; Interview with Fasil Nahum,
supra note 1.
64. See Interview with Fasil Nahum, supra note 1.
65. See, e.g., Anonymous, supra note 29, at 548-51; Chaloka Belanyi, Recent Develop-
ments in the African Human Rights System 2004-2006, United Nations and Regional Human
Rights Systems: Recent Development, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 582, 591-92 (2007); Herther-
Spiro, supra note 1, at 337-38, 364-67; McCracken, supra note 8, at 183-84, 189-93, 195;
Mutua, supra note 41, at 603-04, 611-12; Selassie, supra note 1, at 63-68, 75, 78-79;
Twibell, supra note 1, at 426-27, 438-46; Wigger, supra note 2, at 399-401.
66. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 337-38, 364-67; see also Amnesty Int'l, Ethio-
pia: Prisoners of Conscience on Trial for Treason: Opposition Party Leaders, Human
Rights Defenders and Journalists 2-3 (May 2, 2006), http://www.amnesty.org/en/li-
brary/asset/AFR25/013/2006/en/dom-AFR250132006en.pdf [hereinafter Prisoners of
Conscience].
67. See Prisoners of Conscience, supra note 661, at 3; see also Herther-Spiro, supra note
1, at 337, 364-67.
68. See Prisoners of Conscience, supra note 661, at 3.
69. See id. at 3.
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imprisoned.7" Ethiopian security forces shot and killed forty-two
people and wounded 200 during demonstrations in Addis Ababa
in November 2005."' Approximately 10,000 more demonstrators
and supporters were arrested.7 2 The CUD party believes that sev-
eral thousand of its members and supporters have been held in
prisons throughout the country without charge since 2005. 7" In
May 2006, 111 defendants, including members of four political
opposition parties, faced charges of treason, genocide, armed
conspiracy, and outrages against the Constitution." In addition,
twenty-five people were tried in absentia.7 5 In April 2007, twenty-
eight of those charged were freed when the presiding judge de-
termined that the government had not established sufficient
cases against those defendants. 76 Without having presented a
defense, thirty-eight were convicted in July 2007.77 These thirty-
eight were then pardoned and released on July 20, 2007.78 Of
those who had been charged, the last two prisoners were re-
cently released.79
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 1995 FDRE
ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTION
A. Incorporation of International Human Rights Instruments
into Ethiopian Law
Article 9(4) of the 1995 FDRE Constitution states that, "[a]ll
international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral
70. See id. at 2-3, 5, 7.
71. See id. at 4; see also Belanyi, supra note 65, at 591-92; Herther-Spiro, supra note
1, at 364-67.
72. See Prisoners of Conscience, supra note 66, at 4; see also Herther-Spiro, supra note
1, at 364-67.
73. See Prisoners of Conscience, supra note 66, at 4.
74. See id. at 1.
75. See id. at 17.
76. See generally Amnesty Int'l, Background: Ethiopia Releases 38 Prisoners of Con-
science (July 20, 2007), http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/ethiopia/back-
ground-information-victo ry-ethiopia-reeases38-prisoners-of-conscience/page.do?id=
l181002&nl=3&n2=30&n3=902 [hereinafter Ethiopia Releases].
77. See Ethiopia: Political Repression Must Stop, (Amnesty Int'l, London, U.K.), Aug.
2007, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGAFR250132007&
lang=e.
78. See generally Ethiopia Releases, supra note 76.
79. See generally Amnesty Int'l, Activists Released From Prison in Ethiopia (Mar. 31,
2008), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/good-news/activists-released-
prison-ethiopia-20080331.
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part of the law of the land."8 The current debate regarding in-
corporation of international human rights instruments into Ethi-
opian law is whether ratification alone suffices for domestication
or whether publication in the Federal Negarit Gazeta ("Federal
Gazette") (the official law gazette of the federal government) is
required.81 Despite the explicit nature of Article 9(4), oppo-
nents to incorporation solely through ratification point to the
existence of a provision in Article 71(2), describing the powers
and functions of the President, which reads, "[h] e shall proclaim
in the Negarit Gazeta laws and international agreements ap-
proved by the House of Peoples' Representatives in accordance
with the Constitution."82 Those who argue that publication in
the Federal Gazette is a requirement for incorporation also
point to Proclamation 3, adopted in 1995, which reads, "all fed-
eral or regional legislative, executive and judicial organs as well
as any natural or juridical person shall take judicial notice of
Laws published in the federal Negarit Gazeta."83 Yet, there is
nothing in the proclamation or the articles of the Constitution,
which indicates that publication is a requirement for incorpora-
tion."
The issue of publication in the Federal Negarit Gazeta is
one of practicality, not legality.85 Publication of human rights
treaties in the Federal Gazette would improve access to and com-
prehension of these instruments and empower the courts to in-
voke them.8" Publication of the entire text of any international
human rights covenant or treaty as an official Amharic87 transla-
tion subsequent to ratification followed by the implementation
of national legislation is ideal, but it is not an express require-
ment of the Constitution.88 Thus far, Ethiopia has ratified most
of the major international human rights instruments but has
80. ETH. CONST. art. 9 § 4; see Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Con-
stitutions, supra note 1, at 26-29; Messele, supra note 1, at 15; see also Herther-Spiro, supra
note 1, at 352-53; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50.
81. See Messele, supra note 1 at 15.
82. ETH. CONST. art. 71 § 2; see Messele, supra note 1 at 15.
83. A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of the Federal Negarit
Gazeta, Proc. No. 3, art. 2 § 3 (1995) (Eth.); see Messele, supra note 1, at 15.
84. See Messele, supra note 1, at 15.
85. See id. at 15, 25, 39.
86. See id. at 39.
87. Amharic is the official language of Ethiopia. See U.S. DEPT. OF ST., BACK-
GROUND NOTE: ETHIOPIA (2008), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2859.htm.
88. See Messele, supra note 1, at 25.
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published only one, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC"). 89 However, not a single line of the actual text of the
CRC was published or officially translated.9 ° Its publication was
but a single sentence in the Federal Gazette indicating that it was
henceforth considered as published.9
B. Status of International Human Rights Instruments with Respect to
the Ethiopian Constitution
Another subject of debate is the status of international
human rights instruments with respect to the Constitution.9 2 Ar-
ticle 9(1) of the FDRE Constitution states that the Constitution is
the supreme law of the land.9" It continues by stating that any
law which contravenes the Constitution is null and void.94 Arti-
cle 9(4) describes ratified international treaties as an integral
part of the law of the land, but not the supreme law of the
land.95 It would appear that the Constitution takes precedence
over any ratified international human rights instruments; how-
ever, Article 13(2) of the Constitution includes a provision,
which arguably places certain international human rights instru-
ments on par with the Constitution.96 Article 13(2) reads:
"[t]he fundamental rights and freedoms specified in this Chap-
ter shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the princi-
ples of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Interna-
tional Covenants on Human Rights and international instru-
ments adopted by Ethiopia."9 7  One could argue that a
constitutional requirement to interpret in conformity with the
89. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 352-53; Messele, supra note 1, at 25, 40; see
also Paul, supra note 2, at 236-37.
90. See Messele, supra note 1, at 25.
91. See id.
92. See Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1,
at 26-29; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50; Messele, supra note 1,
at 15; see also Twibell, supra note 1, at 409.
93. ETH. CONST. art. 9 § 1; see Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Con-
stitutions, supra note 1, at 26-29; Messele, supra note 1, at 15; see also Haile, New Ethiopian
Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50; Twibell, supra note 1, at 409.
94. ETH. CONST. art. 9 § 1; see Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Con-
stitutions, supra note 1, at 26-29; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50;
Messele, supra note 1, at 15; see also Twibell, supra note 1, at 409.
95. ETH. CONST. art. 9 § 4; see Messele, supra note 1, at 38.
96. ETH. CONST. art. 13 § 2; see Messele, supra note 1, at 15.
97. ETH. CONST. art. 13 § 2; see Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian
Constitutions, supra note 1, at 26-29; see also Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note
1, at 45-50; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 352-53; Twibell, supra note 1, at 409.
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aforementioned international human rights instruments places
these instruments on par with the Constitution.98 Yet some
scholars argue that providing guidelines for interpreting the
Constitution is far removed from establishing international
human rights instruments as the supreme law of the land.99
Article 93 of the Constitution illustrates the problem which
arises if international human rights instruments are not consid-
ered on par with the Constitution. Article 93 describes proce-
dures for times of emergency, including which fundamental
rights and freedoms are derogable. l00 Article 93 provides that
all fundamental rights and freedoms are derogable during a
state of emergency, except for Articles 18 (prohibition on cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment), 25 (equality before the law),
and 39(1) and (2) (ethnic group rights). 1 ' This list shockingly
does not include the right to life.' °2 This fact alone seems to
demand that certain international human rights instruments are
on par with the Constitution; otherwise, the federal government
would have a constitutional basis for violating a citizen's right to
life during a state of emergency.10 3
III. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN ETHIOPIA
A. The Players
Ethiopia's federal and state governments possess distinct re-
sponsibilities, and each level has its own constitution and execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches. 104 The legislative branch
of the government consists of two houses of parliament.0 5 The
two houses of parliament are the House of People's Representa-
98. See Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1,
at 26-29; see also Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50; Twibell, supra
note 1, at 409.
99. See Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1,
at 26-29; Messele, supra note 1 at 39; see also Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note
1, at 45-50; Twibell, supra note 1, at 409.
100. ETH. CONST. art. 93; see Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Consti-
tutions, supra note 1, at 29-32; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50.
101. ETH. CONST. art. 93; see Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Consti-
tutions, supra note 1, at 29-32; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 45-50.
102. See Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1,
at 30-31; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 48.
103. See Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 49.
104. ETH. CONST. art. 50.
105. Id. art. 53.
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tives ("HOPR") and the HOF. 10 6 The HOPR is the law-making
body, which represents the individual citizens of Ethiopia. 107
The HOPR elects the executive branch, the Council of Ministers
and the Prime Minister from among its members.'08 The
EPRDF currently holds approximately two-thirds of the seats in
the HOPR.'0 9 Both the state and federal governments have in-
dependent judiciaries. 10 The Federal Supreme Court is the
highest court in the land, however, the HOF along with the
Council of Constitutional Inquiry ("CCI") are responsible for
constitutional interpretation."'
1. House of Federation
The HOF is a representative organ of parliament whose
members come from every ethnic group.1 12 Since the HOF rep-
resents all the NN&P of Ethiopia, it is seen as the body with the
duty to resolve conflicts, foster cooperation and ensure equality
between Ethiopia's numerous ethnic groups."' Each ethnic
group is represented in the HOF by one member with an addi-
tional representative per million of its population." 4 The HOF
is also responsible for mediating disputes between states and be-
tween states and the federal government; overseeing any at-
tempts at self-determination or secession; and allocating the fed-
eral budget among the states." 5 Most importantly, the HOF is
the organ of the federal government that is constitutionally man-
dated to settle constitutional disputesa16 and interpret the Con-
106. Id.
107. Id. arts. 54-55. The members of the House of People's Representatives serve
five year terms. Id. art. 54. There are approximately 530 members. See ETH. CONsT. art.
54 § 3; Haile, New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 13.
108. ETH. CONsT. arts. 55 § 13, 73.
109. See Ctr. for Strategic and Int'l Studies, Ethiopia in 2005: The Beginning of a
Transition? 3 (2006), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/anotes0601.pdf [herein-
after Beginning of a Transition]. Prior to the 2005 elections, they held approximately
ninety percent of the seats. See id. at 2.
110. ETH. CONST. art. 78.
111. Id. arts. 80, 84.
112. Id. art. 61.
113. Id. arts. 61-62.
114. Id. art. 61. The members of the House of Federation ("HOF") are either
elected by the State Councils or the State Council can hold elections to have the repre-
sentatives elected by the people. Id.
115. Id. art. 62.
116. Id. art. 83 § 1.
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stitution."17 The HOF's final decision regarding a constitutional
dispute is considered law to be applied in similar cases that arise
in the future." 8 Two parliamentary proclamations (Proclama-
tions 250 and 251) adopted in 2001 clarify the role played by the
HOF in regard to constitutional interpretation." 9 The HOF is
to interpret the Constitution according to the principles of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Cove-
nants of Human Rights, and other adopted international instru-
ments. 12' The HOF organizes the CCI, which plays an advisory
role to the HOF in constitutional interpretation.' 12
2. Council of Constitutional Inquiry
The CCI is the legal advisory body to the House of Federa-
tion.122 The CCI is comprised of eleven members who include
the President and Vice President of the Federal Supreme Court;
three persons designated by the House of Federation from
among its members; and six legal experts appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Republic with the recommendation of the HOPR.121
The function of the CCI is to assist the HOF in deciding consti-
tutional disputes and to discard cases in which no constitutional
interpretation is required. 124 Because CCI is merely an advisory
body its recommendations are non-binding. 125 According to Ar-
ticle 84 of the Constitution, any federal or state court and any
117. Id. art. 62 § 1.
118. A Proclamation to Consolidate the House of the Federation of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and to Define Its Powers and Responsibilities, Proc.
No. 251, art. 11 § 1 (2001) (Eth.), available at http://www.hofethiopia.org/pdf/PROC-
LAMATION NO_251_2001.pdf [hereinafter Proclamation 251].
119. Proclamation 250 elucidates how a court or an individual goes about submit-
ting a constitutional issue to the Council. Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclama-
tion, Proc. No. 250 (2001) (Eth.), available at http://www.hofethiopia.org/pdf/PROC-
LAMATIONNO_250_2001.pdf [hereinafter Proclamation 250]. Proclamation 251 ex-
pounds upon the way in which constitutional questions reach the HOF via the Council
of Constitutional Inquiry ("CCI"). Proclamation 251, supra note 118. Part Two, Articles
4-18, elaborates upon the way in which the HOF shall engage in constitutional interpre-
tation. Id. arts. 4-18.
120. Proclamation 251, supra note 118, art. 7 § 2. These include the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights.
121. Id. art. 3 § 2, 5 § 1.
122. ETH. CONST. arts. 83, 84 § 1.
123. Id. art. 82.
124. Id. art. 84.
125. See id. § 1.
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interested party, be it an individual, organization, nation, or
state, may submit a constitutional challenge to either a state or
federal law to the CCI. 126 Proclamations 250 and 251 extend the
power of constitutional interpretation to include all proclama-
tions, regulations and directives issued by the federal and state
government and international agreements that have been rati-
fied by Ethiopia. 127 Essentially, all acts of the legislature and the
executive are subject to constitutional interpretation by the CCI
and HOF.
3. Courts
The courts are required to submit cases to the CCI and
HOF if they believe that there is a need for constitutional inter-
pretation. 128 If a constitutional dispute exists, the court adjudi-
cating the case does not have the jurisdiction to further investi-
gate or render a ruling on the issue of constitutionality. 129 While
the courts are loathe to do anything which might indicate that
they are engaged in constitutional interpretation, they do have a
duty to enforce the Constitution's fundamental rights and free-
doms, and the principle of precedent, recently established
within the Ethiopian judiciary, may assist them in doing so.' 30
The Court of Cassation recently invoked the Child Rights Con-
vention in a precedent-setting decision.13 1 While there is some
debate as to the extent of its application, the decision clearly
indicated that courts have both the right and the duty to invoke
international human rights instruments in their decisions.'
32
However, despite this breakthrough, courts may still fear citing
international human rights instruments in their decisions. In in-
126. See id. § 2.
127. Proclamation 251, supra note 118, art. 2 § 2; Proclamation 250, supra note
119, art. 2 § 5.
128. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 21; see Haile, Comparing Human Rights
in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1, at 55.
129. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 21; see Haile, Comparing Human Rights
in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1, at 55.
130. See Messele, supra note 1, at 26; A Proclamation To Reamend The Federal
Courts Proclamation Number 25/1996, Proc. No. 454, (2005) (Eth.), available at
http://www.ethiopar.net/type/Amharic/2term5y/2t5y/hopre/bills/I 997/454ae.pdf.
131. See generally Ethiopia: Child Forum Backs Court Decision Over CRC Implementation,
THE DAILY MONITOR (Addis Ababa, Eth.), Mar. 11, 2008, available at http://allafrica.
com/stories/200803111224.html.
132. See Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1,
at 54-59; Twibell, supra note 1, at 409, 418-21, 438-46.
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voking an international human rights instrument, a court could
conceivably be triggering the need for constitutional interpreta-
tion in its very invocation, requiring a referral to the HOF.
B. The Process
When the HOF receives a case involving a constitutional dis-
pute, it first forwards the case to the CCI.133 According to Article
20 of Proclamation 250, the CCI may "develop and implement
principles of constitutional interpretation" which it believes will
be helpful in determining if there is a constitutional question at
issue.' The CCI then investigates the issue.' 35 The CCI may
remand a case to the lower courts if it finds that there is no need
for constitutional interpretation.1 36  If the CC rejects a case
based on a finding that there is no constitutional dispute, and a
party to the case is dissatisfied with this ruling, the party may
appeal directly to the HOF within sixty days from the receipt of
the CCI's decision. 137 The courts, non-governmental organiza-
tions, and individuals can all submit cases to the CCI for adjudi-
cation. -s
If the CCI finds that there is indeed a valid constitutional
dispute and interpretation is necessary, the CCI legally analyzes
the constitutional question and provides a non-binding advisory
recommendation to the HOF.139 The HOF must then make a
final decision within thirty days of the CCI's recommendation
regarding the constitutional dispute. 4 ° Since the CCI is an advi-
sory body, the HOF is free to disregard the CCI's recommenda-
tions. '4 The HOF may further investigate any pertinent consti-
tutional issues, or alternately, it may choose to call upon another
133. Proclamation 251, supra note 118, art. 6.
134. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 20 § 1. Article 26 indicates that the
governmental body in question, when a law is in dispute, will have an opportunity and
an obligation to explain the constitutionality of the law. Id. art. 26. Article 27 provides
that the Council may call any other pertinent institutions, professionals, or organiza-
tions to testify or submit information as it deems necessary. Id. art. 27.
135. Id. art. 17 § 2.
136. ETH. CoNsT. art. 84 § 3.
137. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 18. According to Proclamation 251,
however, the HOF is not obliged to respond to these appeals. It is only obliged to
respond to the CCI. See Proclamation 251, supra note 118, art. 5.
138. See Bedri & Baylis, supra note 15, at 400.
139. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 17.
140. Proclamation 251, supra note 118, art. 13 § 2.
141. ETH. CONsT. arts. 83, 84 § 1.
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body or organ to investigate the dispute and report back to the
HOF prior to its final decision.1 4
2
Both the HOF and the CCI have the capacity to review indi-
vidual human rights cases pertaining to constitutional rights. As
stated in Article 84(2) of the Constitution, any court or inter-
ested party can submit a question of constitutional dispute to the
CCI which shall consider the matter and then submit it to the
HOF for a final decision. 141 In addition, under Proclamation
250, "[a]ny person who alleges that his fundamental rights and
freedoms have been violated by the final decision of any govern-
mental institution or official may present his case to the CCI for
constitutional interpretation." 144 Before an applicant can sub-
mit an application to the CCI or HOF for review, however, the
individual is first required to exhaust all remedies and appeals
within the government institution or body that has allegedly vio-
lated his or her rights. 14 5 If the court in its final determination
holds that a constitutional question exists, the court then "rejects
the case" because they cannot interpret constitutional issues,
and the party can then submit the case to the CCI within ninety
days from the receipt of the decision of the court.1
46
There is some debate regarding the exclusivity of the HOF's
authority over constitutional interpretation in relation to the
courts. The general consensus is that the courts can apply the
Constitution but have no power to interpret the Constitution. 4 7
Some scholars, however, have argued the contrary. 4 Assefa
Fiseha, a noted Ethiopian legal and constitutional scholar, ar-
gues that courts are mandated by the Constitution to enforce the
fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in Chapter III of
the Constitution and that such enforcement cannot be achieved
without the courts engaging in constitutional interpretation."'
142. Proclamation 251, supra note 118, arts. 8-10. The HOF may also call upon
other government institutions, bodies, or organs, those responsible for enacting the law
in question, members of the court handling the case, the parties to the case and other
persons, institutions, or organizations that may be able to offer evidence pertinent to
the case, in order to make its final decision. Id.
143. See ETH. CONsT. art. 84 § 2.
144. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 23 § 1.
145. Id. § 2.
146. Id. art. 22 § 3.
147. See Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
148. See Federalism and Adjudication, supra note 59, at 20-21.
149. Interview with Assefa Fiseha, supra note 56.
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This argument, though providing a theory upon which the pre-
sent understanding of constitutional interpretation can be chal-
lenged, is not part of the general consensus regarding the
courts' role in constitutional interpretation. The dominant view
maintains that the FDRE Constitution and the HOF and CCI
Proclamations deny courts the power of judicial review and con-
fine them to mere application of the laws as promulgated by the
legislature. 151 In addition, in practice, courts do not engage in
constitutional interpretation. 151
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COUNTRIES ENGAGED IN
NON-JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
The Ethiopian constitutional framers' decision to vest the
power of constitutional interpretation in a non-judicial body is
unusual. Worldwide, most political systems utilize some form of
judicial constitutional review, either by way of a supreme court
or a constitutional court.1 52 Many nations with systems of non-
judicial constitutional review do not have reputations for foster-
ing democratic freedoms. Such nations include Bahrain,
Congo, Cuba, North Korea, and Zimbabwe.15 This Section will
describe the political systems in China and the former Soviet
Union, where non-judicial constitutional review contributes or
contributed to government repression. 154 It will also consider
Finland's political system, which stands as an anomaly among
countries engaged in nonjudicial constitutional review, in that
Finland generally fosters democratic representation and human
rights protections. 155
A. China
In China, the National People's Congress ("NPC"), along
with its Standing Committee ("SC"), are the highest political or-
gans in the state 156 and have broad powers.1 57 Among the SC's
150. Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Baylis, supra note 2, at 577-79.
153. See Francisco Ramos Romeu, The Establishment of Constitutional Courts: A Study
of 128 Democratic Constitutions, 2 REV. L. & EcoN. 103 n.1 (2006).
154. See id.
155. See infra Part C.
156. XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 57, § 1 (1982) (P.R.C.).
157. See id. arts. 58, 62-63.
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many functions is interpretation of the Chinese Constitution.'5 8
The Chinese Constitution is the "fundamental law of the state
and has supreme legal authority."' 59 However, despite its power,
the SC has interpreted the constitution less than eight times in
fifty years. 160 In reality, the NPC and SC serve largely to validate
Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") mandates. 16  Many observers
have recommended the creation of a Chinese constitutional
court to help foster discussion of and adherence to constitu-
tional law. 162
Historically, China has not had a strong, independent judi-
ciary. 16' Thejudiciary, along with most branches of government,
is connected to the CCP. 164 Judges in China face an enormous
amount of pressure to mold rulings to suit the whims of local
politicians, prosecutors, and national party officials.' 65 In addi-
tion, judges must refer conflict of laws cases to the SC.166 In
2003, Chinese judge Li Huijuan sparked national controversy
when she invalidated a provincial law because it violated national
law.' 67 The NPC characterized the decision as a "serious breach
of law."' 68 After the controversy over Judge Li's decision, the
NPC established a conflict of laws committee, which some con-
sider a nascent constitutional court. 69
In China there are few mechanisms to ensure that individ-
158. See id. art. 67; Cao Siyuan, Legal: Five Recommendations for Chinese Constitutional
Reform, 111(4) HARV. ASIA Q. (1999), available at http://www.asiaquarterly.com/con-
tent/view/46/40/.
159. XIAN FA pmbl. (1982) (P.R.C.); see also Steven L. Chan, Differences Between Brit-
ish and Chinese Views of Law Forebode Uncertainties for Hong Kong's People After the 1997
Transfer, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 138, 190 n.338 (1996) (noting that Chinese law is
secondary to the Constitution).
160. See, e.g., Hong Kong's Constitutional Debate: Conflict Over Interpretation
189-90 (Johannes M.M. Chan et al. eds., 2000) (citing varying numbers); Baylis, supra
note 2, at 577 n.155 (claiming the Standing Committee has never exercised its power).
161. See Chan, supra note 160, at 180-82.
162. See Siyuan, supra note 158; Veron Hung, China's Constitutional Amendment is
Fawed, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 5, 2004, at 8.
163. WONG KAI SHING, HUM. RTS. SOLIDARITY, CHINA: REFORMING CHINA'S JUDICI-
ARY (2001), http://www.hrsolidarity.net/mainfile.php/2000vollOno06/555/.
164. See Chan, supra note 159, at 178. The author notes that this was true in the
former Soviet Union as well. See id.
165. See SHING, supra note 163.
166. See Jim Yardley, A Judge Tests China's Courts, Making History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
28, 2005, at Al.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
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ual and collective rights are formally recognized within criminal
and civil disputes. 7 ° Constitutional human rights directives
have little force without a mechanism to ensure legislative and
judicial observance. When limited numbers of government offi-
cials have the power to decide constitutional questions, it is un-
likely they will engage in true constitutional review. Many Chi-
nese political and judicial organs merely go through the motions
of protecting rights.17' Ethiopia must work to ensure that its po-
litical system does not create a facade for tyranny, but rather pro-
vides substantive review of government action.
B. The Former Soviet Union ("U.S.S.R. ")
The former Soviet Union ("U.S.S.R.") sought to maintain
control over the former Soviet empire, as well as spread commu-
nism, through ethnic federalism, which is the foundation of the
Ethiopian Constitution.' 7 2 The U.S.S.R.'s political system also
utilized non-judicial constitutional review."' In the U.S.S.R., the
Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of the Nationalities, the two
chambers of the Supreme Soviet, the highest legislative body of
the Soviet Union, could rule on the constitutionality of their
own legislation. 7 4 In practice, both Soviet parliamentary bodies'
constitutional review powers were largely ceremonial as they af-
firmed whatever laws were put before them.175
As in most Marxist countries, the Soviet judiciary was weak
by design.'7 6 Marxists viewed the legal profession and the judici-
ary as bourgeois institutions and law as a tool of the ruling
class.' 77 The Soviets considered separation of powers unneces-
sary since each branch of government worked towards the com-
mon goal of furthering communism. 71 In a Marxist regime, the
170. See Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double
Standard?, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71, 147-48 (2005).
171. See supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
172. See Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions, supra note 1,
at 10-11.
173. See Konstitutsiia SSSR (1977) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution) art. 73 § 11.
174. See id. art. 121 § 5.
175. See Baylis, supra note 2, at 577 n.155.
176. See MAURO CAPALLETI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 7
(1971) (noting that the Soviets viewed judicial review of legislative activity as "bourgeois
doctrine").
177. See id.
178. See Anna M. Kuzmik, Rule of Law and Legal Reform in Ukraine: A Review of the
New Procuracy Law, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 611, 614 (1993).
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rule of law is subservient to socialist ideology. 179 Therefore, most
communist countries devoted few resources to a well-developed
legal system. 1 8
The Supreme Soviet elected judges for limited terms, mak-
ing the judiciary highly dependent on political bodies. 8 1 As in
China, the Soviet judiciary was beholden to the Communist
Party.'8 2 Structurally, the Soviet judiciary was part of the execu-
tive branch 18 3 and became a powerful tool of the Party.8 4 Com-
munist courts enforced laws as expressions of socialist policy,
rather than as directives on societal behavior.81 5
In 1988 the Congress of People's Deputies amended the So-
viet Constitution to provide for the establishment of the Com-
mittee on Constitutional Supervision ("CCS"). 8 6 While the CCS
could invalidate unconstitutional laws, other government bodies
ignored the CCS's decisions if they were in conflict with socialist
doctrine and state power. 87 Thus, although the 1977 Constitu-
tion enumerated a number of civil, political, economic, and so-
cial rights,188 neither the CCS nor the courts were able to en-
force them.8 9 Soviet scholars acknowledged this paradox, con-
structing and advancing the idea of two distinct de jure and de
facto constitutions.9 0 Similar to the 1977 Soviet Constitution,
Ethiopia's Constitution enumerates an impressive list of human
rights.' 9' These rights are meaningless, however, if Ethiopians
179. See Molly Warner Lien, Red Star Trek: Seeking a Role for Constitutional Law in
Soviet Disunion, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 41, 65-67 (1994).
180. See id. at 66.
181. See Konstitutsiia SSSR art. 152.
182. See Chan, supra note 159, at 178.
183. See Scott P. Boylan, The Status of Judicial Reform in Russia, 13 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1327, 1334 (1998).
184. See id. at 1327-28 (recounting the ad hoc Soviet legal process of having the
judge telephone a party official to determine how to rule).
185. See Kuzmik, supra note 178, at 611.
186. See Lien, supra note 179, at 85 n.215.
187. See id. at 87-88.
188. See, e.g., Konstitutsiia SSSR chs. 6-7 (listing "Citizenship of the U.S.S.R/Equal-
ity of Citizens' Rights" and "The Basic Rights, Freedoms, and Duties of Citizens of the
U.S.S.R."): see also Harold J. Berman, Counterrevolution or Transition: A Response to
Human Rights and the Emergence of the State of the Rule of Law in the USSR, 40 EMORY L.J.
903, 906 (1991).
189. See Lien, supra note 179, at 87.
190. See id. at 81.
191. See supra Part II.
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do not have an impartial, professional judiciary to interpret the
constitution and ensure enforcement.
It is difficult to deny the Marxist underpinnings of Ethio-
pia's system of non-judicial constitutional review. Ethiopia's
brand of ethnic federalism was partly inspired by the Soviet Con-
stitution, which combined the federal states of former nation
states into one nation. 9 2 This influence can be seen in similar
phrasing of the countries' respective constitutions.
193
The Marxist influence on the Ethiopian political system is
also apparent in the weakness of the Ethiopian judiciary, includ-
ing the deprivation of the power of judicial review.' 94 As stated
previously, Marxist political systems generally vest the power of
constitutional review in parliamentary bodies while purposefully
weakening the judiciary.' 95 Under the Derg, which espoused
Marxist ideology, the executive branch was very strong and the
judiciary was a mere appendage of the executive. 9 6 In the So-
viet Union and Eastern European communist nations, courts did
not adhere to the separation of powers doctrines that had devel-
oped in Western European countries and the United States.' 97
The TPLF, which played a major role in the framing of Ethi-
opia's 1995 Constitution, was once a hard-line, communist
group.198 Some have even noted that the TPLF was more de-
192. See Baylis, supra note 2, at 577 n.155.
193. The Soviet constitution stated:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is an integral, federal, multina-
tional state formed on the principle of socialist federalism as a result of the
free self-determination of nations and the voluntary association of equal Soviet
Socialist Republics.
The U.S.S.R. embodies the state unity of the Soviet people and draws all
its nations and nationalities together for the purpose ofjointly building commu-
nism.
Konstitutsiia SSSR art. 70 (emphasis added). The Marxist influence is evident in the
Ethiopian Constitution, which begins, "[w]e, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethi-
opia ... in full and free exercise of our right to self-determination, to building a political
community .. " ETH. CONST. pmbl.(emphasis added).
194. See Baylis, supra note 2, at 577 n.155; Interview with Mahdere Paulos, Direc-
tor, Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association, in Addis Abbaba, Eth. (Mar. 25, 2008)
("[The] HOF has such power.").
195. See Zdenek Kfihn, Worlds Apart: Western and Central European Judicial Culture at
the Onset of the European Enlargement, 52 Am. J. CoMP. L. 531, 539-40 (2004).
196. See Interview with Eshetu W. Semayat, supra note 62.
197. See Kfihn, supra note 195, at 539-40.
198. See generally Peter Biles, Profile: Ethiopian leader Meles Zenawi, BBC NEws, Aug.
10, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4545711.stm.
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voted to Marxism than the Derg.' 99 Since the fall of the Derg,
the TPLF has been the ruling faction of the EPRDF.20  The
TPLF has since embraced capitalist economic development and
Western support.20 ' However, the effects of the early Marxist in-
fluences are still apparent in Ethiopia's system of non-judicial
constitutional review.
C. Finland
Finland is an anomaly in that it is a stable democracy that
effectively utilizes nonjudicial constitutional review.20 2 Finland's
government is a unicameral parliamentary government, with no
constitutional court.203 The Eduskunta, a proportionally repre-
sentative parliamentary body, is the supreme legal authority in
Finland. 20 4 The Eduskunta appoints a Constitutional Law Com-
mittee ("CLC") to interpret the constitution and determine the
constitutionality of legislation.20 5 The CLC decides on the con-
stitutionality of laws prior to enactment of legislation. 20 6  The
CLC also determines if legislation is in line with international
human rights standards.20 7
The CLC draws its membership from the body of the Edus-
kunta, making it an inherently political, rather than judicial,
body.20 The Eduskunta has no obligation to accept the CLC's
199. Interview with Anonymous, Professor of Law, Addis Ababa University Faculty
of Law, in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Mar. 2008).
200. See generally Biles, supra note 198.
201. See generally id.; Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions,
supra note 1, at 10.
202. See Baylis, supra note 2, at 579 n.161; U.S. DEPT. OF ST., COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACtiCES, FINLAND (2007), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2007/100558.htm [hereinafter FINLAND HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES]. But see Maria
Dakolias, Are We There Yet?: Measuring Success of Constitutional Reform, 39 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1117, 1137 (2006) (reporting declining voter confidence in the Finnish gov-
ernment).
203. See SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [Constitution] §§ 24, 74 (Fin.).
204. SeeJaakko Husa, Guarding the Constitutionality of Laws in the Nordic Countries: A
Comparative Perspective, 48 Asi. J. CoMp. L. 345, 364-65 (2000).
205. See SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI § 74. The Constitutional Law Committee ("CLC")
reviews around twenty legislative acts per year. See Dakolias, supra note 202, at 1163.
206. Ministry ofJustice, Finland-The judicial System of Finland, http://www.om.
fi/en/Etusivu/Ministerio/Oikeuslaitosesite#Jurisdiction_ [hereinafter Judicial System
of Finland].
207. See Veli-Pekka Hautamdki, Authoritative Interpretation of the Constitution: A Com-
parison of Argumentation in Finland and Norway, 6.3 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. LAW, 1, 7
(2002), available at http://www.ejcl.org/63/art63-1.pdf.
208. See SUOMEN PERUSrUSLAKi § 35; Hautamdki, supra note 207, at 7.
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recommendation but has never rejected a recommendation.2 °9
To ensure compliance with Finnish law and the Constitution,
the CLC seeks the advice of legal experts and practitioners
whose opinions are met with a great deal of deference by the
CLC.2 10 While Finnish courts do not interpret the constitution
or decide on the constitutionality of acts, they do apply constitu-
tional law.2 11 The courts may also determine the legality of gov-
ernmental action below the parliamentary level.21 2
For the most part, Finland's system of constitutional review
has been successful in terms of maintenance of human rights
protections.21 3 Finland's political stability has allowed the coun-
try to take the time to refine a fairly unusual system.21 4 Ethiopia
was recovering from a long, drawn-out civil war when the fram-
ers drafted an entirely new constitution and system of govern-
ment.2 15 Ethiopia does not have the requisite political stability
as exists in Finland to engage in the same constitutional experi-
mentation. In addition, the relationship between the Edus-
kunta, the CLC, and the Finnish courts is less complex than Ethi-
opia's bureaucratic system. 2 16 Unlike its Ethiopian counterpart,
the Finnish constitution directs courts to apply the constitution
without interpretation.21
V. PRA CTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NON-JUDICIAL
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW ON THE ENFORCMENT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ETHIOPIA
A. The Independence of the House of the Federation
Ethiopia's system of non-judicial constitutional review has
many practical implications for the protection of human rights.
A body which is empowered to interpret the fundamental law of
209. See Hautamaiki, supra note 207, at 7.
210. See id.
211. See Judicial System of Finland, supra note 206.
212. See SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI §§ 106-07; EUROPEAN JUDICIAL NETWORK IN CIVIL
AND POLITICAL MATTERS, LEGAL ORDER-FINLAND, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/le-
gal-order/legal-order_fin-en.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
213. See generally FINLAND HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 202.
214. SeeJaakko Nousianen, The Finnish System Of Government: From A Mixed Constitu-
tion To Parliamentarism, 8, http://www.om.fi/en/Etusivu/Perussaannoksia/Perustuslaki
(follow "The Finnish System of Government" hyperlink).
215. See supra Introduction and Part I.
216. See supra Part II.
217. See SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI § 106.
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the land should be independent and free from any kind of polit-
ical influence. The HOF's representatives are accountable, not
to the Constitution, but to the NN&P of Ethiopia whom they
represent. The HOF is also a political organ operating within
the context of a federal government dominated by a ruling
party, the EPRDF, which has an excess of power in all branches
of government. 218 The HOF lacks complete independence from
the EPRDF and the executive branch of government.2 ' 9 Thus,
the HOF is not likely to rule against the government when adju-
dicating constitutional disputes. 220 As a political organ under
the influence of the executive, the HOF should not be called
upon to decide sensitive political issues because it cannot be ex-
pected to decide such matters in a fair, unbiased manner.22'
Fundamental rights and freedoms may lose out to political con-
siderations favoring the ruling party and the executive.222 The
HOF is also not capable of ruling against itself.223 HOF mem-
bers are typically also State Council members and sometimes Re-
gional Chief Executives. 224 Therefore, the HOF may be called
upon to determine the constitutional validity of either its own
state legislation or its own exertions of power as Chief Executives
at the regional level.2 2 5 In such cases, it is unlikely that the HOF
would declare its own exertions of authority to have exceeded
constitutional bounds and impinged upon the fundamental
rights and freedoms of state citizens.2 2 6
218. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 6, 59; see also Anony-
mous, supra note 29, at 549-50; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 337-38; Medlock Wigger,
supra note 2, at 401; Selassie, supra note 1, at 75, 78-79; Twibell, supra note 1, at 446.
219. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 52-53; see also Wigger,
supra note 2, at 401; Selassie, supra note 1, at 78-79.
220. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 52-53; see also Baylis,
supra note 2, at 553-54; Wigger, supra note 2, at 401; Selassie, supra note 1, at 78-79;
Twibell, supra note 1, at 448-49.
221. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 59; see also Baylis,
supra note 2, at 553-54; Wigger, supra note 2, at 401; Selassie, supra note 1, at 78-79;
Twibell, supra note 1, at 447.
222. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 54-59; see also Baylis,
supra note 2, at 553-54; Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 337-38; Medlock Wigger, supra
note 2, at 401; Selassie, supra note 1, at 75; Twibell, supra note 1, at 447.
223. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 54; see also Twibell,
supra note 1, at 447.
224. See Stephanie Kodish, Balancing Representation: Special Representation Mecha-
nisms Addressing the Imbalance of Marginaliz,.d Voices in African Legislatures, 30 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 1, 81-83; Selassie, supra note 1, at 78-79.
225. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 447.
226. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 59; see also Baylis,
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The case brought by the leading opposition political party,
the CUD, against the Prime Minister in 2005, is the perfect ex-
ample of how the HOF is unwilling to rule against another organ
of the federal government. The CUD case involved the exer-
tions of power by the Prime Minister following the May 2005 par-
liamentary elections. The CUD questioned the Prime Minister's
constitutional authority to issue a decree banning public demon-
strations thereby curbing the constitutional right of assembly for
a month following the disputed elections. 2 27 The Federal First
Instance Court received the case, ruled that the dispute required
constitutional interpretation and referred the matter to the
CCI. 2 28 The CUD lawyers appealed the case to the Federal High
Court, arguing that mere application of the Constitution would
prove that the Prime Minister had overstepped his constitutional
bounds.22 9 The CCI remanded the case to the Federal First In-
stance Court, ruling that no constitutional interpretation was re-
quired because the Prime Minister had not exceeded his consti-
tutional authority.230 The Federal High Court had no choice but
to reject the appeal on these same grounds. Subsequently, the
Federal First Instance Court came down with a ruling in line
with the CCI's decision. 23 1 This indicates an inability on the part
of the CCI and the HOF to adjudicate sensitive political issues,
because they are not independent from the ruling party.2 32 This
case also indicates the courts' reluctance to engage in constitu-
tional interpretation involving sensitive political issues. 23 3 A Fed-
eral High CourtJudge noted that since the HOF is not indepen-
dent from the ruling party, it would never rule against the gov-
ernment or Prime Minister.234
supra note 2, at 553-54; Wigger, supra note 2, at 401; Selassie, supra note 1, at 78-79;
Twibell, supra note 1, at 447.
227. See Dagnachew Teklu, Court Sends Meles Zenawi's Case to Inquiry Council, THE
AFRICA MONITOR, June 7, 2005, at B1, available at http://www.theafricamonitor.com/
resources/55%20English%20issue%20June%207,%202005.pdf, Interview with Anony-
mous, supra note 60.
228. See Teklu, supra note 227; Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
229. See Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See Anonymous, supra note 29, at 549-50; Haile, supra note 1, at 54-59;
Herther-Spiro, supra note 1, at 337-38, 350-52, 354-55, 364-67; Selassie, supra note 1, at
78-79; Twibell, supra note 1, at 446-49; Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
233. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 446-49; Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
234. Interview with Anonymous, supra note 60.
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The Mrs. Kedija Beshir case demonstrates that the HOF is
much more comfortable with cases when they do not touch
upon sensitive political issues or involve the government as a de-
fendant.2 5 The Beshir case involved a Muslim woman who had
declined adjudication on a family matter within the Sharia
Courts. 23 6 The Constitution states that all parties in a matter
before the Sharia Courts must consent to adjudication within the
Sharia Court system or the matter must be moved to the civil
courts. 23 7 The Sharia Courts refused to acknowledge Mrs.
Beshir's constitutional rights. 238  She was represented by the
Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association ("EWLA") who assisted
her in appealing the matter to the CCI. 239 The HOF ruled that
her constitutional rights had been violated. 24° This is a positive
example of the HOF upholding the constitutional rights of an
individual. 24 1 However, this matter was seen as a simple family
242
matter not touching upon any sensitive political issues. As was
suggested by an Ethiopian human rights defender, if Mrs.
Beshir's case had involved a sensitive political issue such as the
government's denial of a woman's right, it would never have
been decided in such a manner.243 Thus, although the HOF
should be applauded for upholding Kedija Beshir's constitu-
tional rights, this case is insufficient to conclude that the HOF is
effectively protecting the constitutional rights of citizens.2 44
What if, for instance, one of the parties in a certain constitu-
tional case is the government?245 What if a certain case requires
limiting the power exercised by the government in order to en-
force the constitutional rights of citizens? 246 The CUD case fol-
235. See Interview with Mahdere Paulos, supra note 194; see generally HOUSE OF THE
FEDERATION, APPEAL OF MRS. KEDIJA BESHIR AGAINST BEINGJUDGED BY SHERIA COURT AND
DECISION OF HOUSE OF FEDERATION BY WHICH DECISION OF 3RD NAIBA COURT REPEALED
(2004), http://www.hofethiopia.org/pdf/CI%2ODessiontion-4.pdf; see also 2 ETHIOPIAN
'"'OMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, SELECTED CASES 4-5.
236. See generally ETHIOPIAN WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 235.
237. See id.; ETH. CONST. art. 34 § 5.
238. See generally ETHIOPIAN WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 235.
239. See generally id.
240. See generally id.
241. See generally id.
242. See generally id.
243. See Interview with Mahdere Paulos, supra note 194; Interview with Anony-
mous, supra note 60.
244. See Interview with Mahdere Paulos, supra note 194.
245. See id.
246. See id.
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lowing the May 2005 elections perfectly exemplifies this prob-
lem.
The National Identity Claim Case in the southern region
illustrates the HOF's reluctance to rule against a government
body, albeit, in this instance, the government body was a state
and not a federal body. 247 The Silte people of southern Ethiopia
no longer wished to be considered part of the Gurage Nation,
but rather, a Nation in their own right.248 The HOF vindicated
the rights of the Silte people in their claim for national identity;
however, the extreme deference paid to the state government,
including the HOF's reluctance to even state that the HOF was
directing the state government as to how to respond, demon-
strates the HOF's discomfort in confronting another govern-
ment body.249 Additionally, the HOF waited years before ac-
cepting the case, hoping that the Southern Region would resolve
the matter themselves. 2"0  The Southern Region, however, did
not wish to do so without the constitutional guidance of the
HOF.251 It was suggested by an eminent Ethiopian scholar that
the National Identity Claim case, if submitted now, would never
be accepted by the CCI, nor adjudicated in the same manner by
the HOF, due to current political circumstances. 25 2 At the pre-
sent time, there are currently fifteen other ethnic groups in the
Southern region making claims for national identity.25 This is a
sensitive political issue because the Southern region already has
forty-eight NN&P represented in the HOF.254 This is an exam-
ple of how a political organ is not the best entity to resolve sensi-
tive political issues that raise constitutional questions. 255
Another issue involving the HOF's independence is the
247. See generally HOUSE OF THE FEDERATION, DECISION OF THE HOUSE OF THE FEDER-
ATION REGARDING RESOLUTION OF CLAIM FOR IDENTITY (2001), http://www.hofethiopia.
org/pdf/CI%20Dessiontion_2.pdf [hereinafter HOF, SILTE]; see Bedri & Baylis, supra
note 15, at 400-02; Baylis, supra note 2, at 565-68.
248. See Bedri & Baylis, supra note 15, at 400-01.
249. See generally HOF, SILTE, supra note 247; see also Baylis, supra note 2, at 567.
250. See generally HOF, SILTE, supra note 247; see also Baylis, supra note 2, at 566-67.
251. See Baylis, supra note 2, at 566.
252. See Interview with Getachew Assafa, Constitutional Law Professor, Addis
Ababa University Faculty of Law, in Addis Abbaba, Eth. (Mar. 27, 2008).
253. See id.
254. THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, HOUSE OF FEDERATION, HiS-
TORY- THE HOUSE OF FEDERATION, http://www.hofethiopia.org/HOF/HOF_History.
html [hereinafter HOF HISTORY].
255. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 447-48.
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physical proximity of the HOF/CCI and EPRDF offices that oc-
cupy the same physical structure in the capital Addis Ababa.2 5 6
Since plaintiffs must physically file complaints in the HOF and
CCI offices, a potential plaintiff bringing a case against the
EPRDF or other branches of government under its influence
may be intimidated to do so. Although the CCI Registrar sug-
gested that potential plaintiffs are unlikely to realize that the
EPRDF and HOF occupy the same physical structure because of
a lack of exterior signage,257 the authors observed signage which
clearly indicates the location of the EPRDF offices within the
same building as the HOF and CCI.
B. Checks and Balances
Constitutional limits on the power of government are neces-
sary for a true democracy to exist.258 The means used to limit
governmental authority, such as separation of powers, checks
and balances, and promulgation of human rights cannot be en-
forced without an independent body that can determine
whether the government has exceeded the limits of its constitu-
tional authority.259 Separation of powers is based on the idea
that no branch of government should be granted excessive
power. 260 Each branch of government has constitutionally man-
dated responsibilities and obligations and is given the power to
fulfill those responsibilities. 26 ' Branches of government are to
act as co-equals and assert their powers as a check and balance
on the other branches. 262
The Ethiopian system of non-judicial constitutional review
does not serve to protect the human rights of its citizens because
it leaves the federal and state governments with virtually unlim-
ited power.2 6' The executive branch has the power to do as it
256. Interview with Registrar, Council of Constitutional Inquiry, in Addis Ababa,
Eth. (Mar. 28, 2008).
257. Id.
258. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 50.
259. See id. at 53.
260. Sudha Setty, The President's Question Time: Power, Information, and the Executive
Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 248, 248 (2008).
261. See Sean Mulryne, A Tripartite Battle Royal: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the Asser-
tion of Separation-of-Powers Principles, SETON HALL L. REv. 279, 297 (2008).
262. Id.
263. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 46.
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wishes with no judicial check on its activities. 264 The EPRDF,
which dominates the executive, also represents the majority
party in the HOPR.2 6 5 Therefore, it is unlikely that the HOPR
would be able to curtail the excessive power of the executive
branch. In the absence of a legitimate mechanism to review the
constitutionality of the executive branch's acts and decrees, the
Prime Minister and Council of Ministers possess unbridled polit-
266ical power.
Proclamations 250 and 251, which extend the HOF's power
of constitutional review, further weaken the judiciary's ability to
serve as a check on executive power. Before promulgation of
the Proclamations, some had argued that the judiciary had the
power to review executive action as the Constitution limits HOF
constitutional review to laws enacted by federal and state legisla-
tive bodies.26 7 However, the Proclamations extended HOF con-
stitutional review to include all acts of the legislature and the
executive which precludes the judiciary from any form of consti-
tutional review.2 " According to the Proclamations, the HOF has
the power to interpret proclamations, regulations and directives
issued by the federal and state government and international
agreements that have been ratified by Ethiopia. 269
The breakdown of separation of powers in Ethiopia is a re-
sult of a system in which a political organ with strong ties to the
executive is the final arbiter of the constitutionality of the execu-
tive's political acts. One of the outcomes of this system is that
judges are fearful of ruling on politically sensitive cases. This
form of judicial timidity was evident in the CUD case brought
against the Prime Minister after the 2005 elections discussed
above.2 70 The court's timidity perhaps led it to decide that the
case involved a question of constitutional interpretation so that
it could escape having to rule on the validity of the Prime Minis-
ter's actions in a politically sensitive case. However, even if the
court had decided to rule on the validity of the Prime Minister's
264. See Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 21; Haile, The New Ethiopian Consti-
tution, supra note 1, at 55.
265. See Beginning of a Transition, supra note 109, at 3.
266. See Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 1, at 46.
267. See Federalism and Adjudication, supra note 59, at 21.
268. See Interview with Assefa Fiseha, supra note 56.
269. Proclamation 251, supra note 118, art. 2 § 2; Proclamation 250, supra note
119, art. 2 § 5.
270. See supra Part V.A.
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actions by applying the Constitution and finding that the Prime
Minister had in fact overstepped his authority, the HOF could
have easily overturned such a decision by declaring that there
was in fact an issue of constitutional interpretation and therefore
it was not within the courts' power to decide the case.271 In
other words, by invoking the issue of constitutional interpreta-
tion, whether such an issue does or does not exist, the HOF can
always deprive the judiciary of the power to adjudicate sensitive
cases dealing with the limits of executive power.
C. Protection of Minorities
Constitutional interpretation in Ethiopia, as adjudicated by
a political body representing the interests of the NN&P, cannot
adequately protect the constitutional rights of minority ethnic
groups. This is in direct opposition to the ostensible aims of the
Constitution, as an expression of the sovereignty and self-deter-
mination of all of the ethnic groups of Ethiopia.2 2 An impartial
body, not constitutionally beholden to any of the ethnic groups,
is required to resolve sensitive disputes between ethnic groups.
A political body, which represents the various interests of the
ethnic groups, is not in a position to resolve such matters.
Though the HOF is meant to protect minority ethnic
groups, reflect the diversity of the Ethiopian people and pro-
mote equality and unity among Ethiopia's various ethnic groups,
this cannot be fully realized due to the HOF's majoritarian
make-up.273 Each ethnic group is represented in the HOF by
one member with an additional representative per million of its
population.2 74  Accordingly, the Oromos, the largest ethnic
group in Ethiopia, and the Amharas, another majority ethnic
group, control over fifty275 out of the 112276 seats in the HOF.
Thus, even though the HOF was meant to be a counter-
271. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
273. TSEGAYE REGASSA, STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN FEDERAL ETHIOPIA: A PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATION 2-3 (2004), available at http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/subpapers/
regassa.pdf.
274. ETH. CONST. art. 61 § 2.
275. Ethiopia's total population is approximately 82 million. CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, ETHIOPIA (2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html. The Oromos make up 32.1% of the
population while the Amharas make up another 30.1%. Id.
276. HOF HISTORY, supra note 254.
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majoritarian balance to the majoritarianism in the HOPR, the
larger ethnic groups still maintain a numerical advantage. It is
constitutionally mandated that two-thirds of the 112 members of
the HOF constitutes a quorum for voting purposes. 27 7 This
means that a vote by thirty-eight out the seventy-five present
members is enough for a decision to be binding in the HOF27
and could lead to the possibility that certain groups with larger
representation can dominate decisions. Accordingly, the
majoritarian composition of the HOF could lead to the tyranny
of the majority in sensitive constitutional disputes between eth-
nic groups.
D. Access to Justice
Non-judicial constitutional review in Ethiopia has created
an overly bureaucratic, inefficient system ofjustice that has nega-
tively impacted access to justice for Ethiopia's citizens. In its en-
tire fifteen year history, the HOF has issued only four deci-
sions.2 " Although the HOF is technically accessible to every
Ethiopian, there is very little public awareness of its existence or
function. 2"0 Non-judicial constitutional review has also stopped
Ethiopian judges from developing a robust body of human
rights jurisprudence. 21'
Part of the reason for the HOF's inefficiency in constitu-
tional review rests in the part-time status of the institution. Con-
stitutional review should be a full-time endeavor; yet, the only
full-time employee of the CCI is its Registrar who is not involved
in adjudicating constitutional cases.282 The HOF is supposed to
meet twice a year,2 3 and the CCI is mandated to meet four times
per year,28 4 but the CCI rarely fulfills its mandate and the HOF
routinely does not meet often enough to address all the issues
put before it.28 5 Even when the CCI does convene, many times
277. ETH. CONST. art. 64 § 1.
278. See id.
279. See Interview with Registrar, supra note 256; Interview with Getahun Kassa,
supra note 56.
280. See Interview with Registrar, supra note 256.
281. See Interview with Tilahun Teshome, supra note 58.
282. ETH. CONST. art. 67.
283. See Interview with Registrar, supra note 256.
284. Proclamation 250, supra note 119, art. 13.
285. See Interview with Registrar, supra note 256; Interview with Getahun Kassa,
supra note 56.
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there is not a quorum, and therefore they cannot conduct any
business related to constitutional review.2" 6 The HOF and CCI
cannot fully consider cases and address them expeditiously as
part-time institutions2" 7 and this has led to public inaccessibility.
A mere seventy-two cases regarding constitutional interpre-
tation have been submitted to the CCI Registrar in fifteen
years.2"8 The HOF and CCI have only accepted four of these
cases, rejecting the vast majority on procedural and substantive
grounds. 28 9 One cannot but marvel at such a low number of sub-
mitted cases emanating from a country of seventy million people
that has experienced substantial human rights issues. Of the
sixty-eight cases submitted to the CCI, only four or five have
been referred from the courts.290 This perhaps signals that
courts are either intimidated by the prospect of referring cases
to the CCI or are simply unaware of which cases are appropriate
for CCI and HOF adjudication. The remaining sixty-four cases
were direct appeals from individuals, organizations, and other
government bodies. 291
The small number of cases submitted to the CCI and HOF
reveals the lack of public awareness regarding the important
functions of these institutions. Although the Ministry of Justice
and non-governmental organizations have tried to initiate public
outreach, 29 2 neither the HOF nor the CCI has educated the pub-
lic or practitioners on how to navigate this complicated system.
The low number also indicates that legal practitioners do not
take the CCI seriously due to its lack of capacity. 293 Though the
level of cases being brought to the CCI and HOF is well below
what it should be, the CCI and HOF would not have the capacity
to manage an increase in cases above its current level.29 4
286. See Interview with Registrar, supra note 256.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See Interview with Eshetu W. Semayat, supra note 62.
293. See Interview with Getahun Kassa, supra note 56.
294. See id.
2008]
294 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:259
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT,
ORGANIZED AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN ETHIOPIA
Ethiopia's system of constitutional review is broken. As ex-
plored in the previous sections, the HOF, which has been in exis-
tence for over a decade, has proven itself a conceptual and prac-
tical failure in constitutional adjudication. The HOF's ineffi-
ciency and political subjectivity in interpreting the FDRE
Constitution, and the numerous avenues for abuse, have led and
will lead to failure in protecting the fundamental rights and free-
doms of citizens. The power of constitutional interpretation
should be taken away from the HOF and placed with a strength-
ened judiciary that must undergo judicial reforms.
The Constitution empowers the judiciary and other govern-
mental organs to respect and enforce the Constitution's human
rights provisions. 295 The judiciary, however, cannot fulfill this
role and enforce the constitutional provisions concerning
human and democratic rights and freedoms if its most powerful
and important tool-judicial review-is withheld. Because the
courts are constitutionally independent and accountable to no
one but the law, they are the best option for protecting the
human rights enshrined in the Constitution.
The institution of judicial review has not been without its
detractors. Those who argue againstjudicial review contend that
it is undemocratic because it allows unelected judges to nullify
the acts of democratically elected legislatures who are accounta-
ble to the people.296 They also argue that it violates the separa-
tion of powers doctrine by allowing the courts, in the process of
issuing judgments, to encroach upon the legislature's lawmaking
functions. 297 Prominent jurists who have argued in favor ofjudi-
cial review note that necessary governmental limitations are best
enforced by the courts. 298 Judicial review is one of the institu-
295. See supra Part 111.3.
296. See Dennis Davis et. al., Democracy and Constitutionalism: The Role of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, in RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL
ORDER 1, 6 (Dawid van Wyk et. al. eds., 1994).
297. See Bruce G. Peabody, LegislatingFrom The Bench: A Definition And A Defense, 1
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 185, 217-18 (2007).
298. See HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF
THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 314 (1993).
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tional checks against excesses by federal and state legislatures. 29
If a government's power vis-A-vis its citizens is to be limited, an
institution insulated from popular control, like the judiciary, is
best placed to assume this role.3"' In addition, the courts' close-
ness to the law creates a special institutional competence for the
exercise of the power of constitutional interpretation."'
When the courts are charged with judicial review and can
check the excesses of the other branches of government, they
also engage in the safeguarding of their own independence.
In Ethiopia, the parliament has used its power to annul the ef-
fects of judicial decisions. The 2001 Anti-Corruption Proclama-
tion 303 is a case in point. Although a court had ordered the re-
lease of the former Chief Military General, Siye Abraha, on bail
following his corruption case, Parliament subsequently issued an
amendment to the proclamation denying the right to bail for
persons accused of alleged corruption. 0 4 Abraha and twenty-
one others accused of corruption who retroactively lost their
right to bail because of the new amendment appealed to the CCI
for invalidation of the amendment on the basis of non-retroactiv-
ity of criminal law, which is one of the fundamental principles in
Chapter III of the Constitution.0 5 After two years, the CCI rec-
ommended to the House of Federation that their claim be re-
jected, finding that the amending proclamation was not uncon-
stitutional. 0 6
As the above-mentioned case demonstrates, granting the ju-
diciary the power of judicial review through constitutional re-
form alone will not suffice. There is also the need for judicial
reform to strengthen the judiciary so it is up to the important
299. See id.
300. See WALTER F. MURPHY ET. AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
267 (1995).
301. See id. at 266.
302. See ABRAHAM, supra note 298, at 315.
303. Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence (Amendment)
Proclamation, Proc. No. 239 (2001) (Eth.), available at http://www.federalsupreme
court.gov.et/Negarit%20Gazeta/Gazeta-1993/Proc%20No. %20239-2001 %20Anti-Cor-
ruption%20Special%2OProcedure%20and%2ORul.pdf.
304. See GETACIIEW KITAW, ETHIOPIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL REFORM FOR HAR-
NESSING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 13, http://Nv.eeaecon.org/EEA/con-
ferences/papers/Getachew%20Kita%20-%20PROBLEMS%200F%20THE%20ETHI-
OPIA%20JUDICLARY.doc.
305. ETH. CONST. art. 22.
306. See Interview with Eshetu W.Semayat, supra note 62.
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task ofjudicial review and can withstand the strongarming of the
executive ad legislature. Judicial reforms seek to create an inde-
pendent and effective judiciary that is able to improve govern-
ance and advance development. The Ethiopian government has
embarked upon a program of judicial reform. Although this is
commendable, the government's program is limited mainly to
file management and organizational issues.3 ° 7 To make mean-
ingful changes in the true sense ofjudicial reform, there is much
more to be done. Earlier assessments by justice sector reform
programs in Ethiopia revealed deficits in the institutional, orga-
nizational, human and financial capacity of both the federal and
regional courts. 30 ' This in turn can be expressed in terms of the
manner judges are appointed, promoted, disciplined and re-
moved.309
In order to safeguard and strengthen the judiciary's inde-
pendence and therefore increase its ability to effectively engage
in judicial review the system of appointing judges in Ethiopia
should be reformed. The president and vice president of the
Federal Supreme Court are recommended by the Prime Minis-
ter and appointed by the HOPR.310 For other federal judges, the
Prime Minister submits candidates selected by the Federal Judi-
cial Administrative Council to the HOPR for appointment.'
The parliament has thus far never denied the appointment of a
judge submitted by the Prime Minister. 12 This indicates the ab-
sence of the checks and balances envisaged by the Constitution.
In other countries, Bar Associations, law schools, practicing law-
yers and others comprise judicial administration councils that
aid in the appointment of judges,313 and lessen the potential for
executive abuse in appointments. This practice helps in making
the appointments ofjudges more transparent and should be im-
plemented in Ethiopia.
The need for judicial reform is uncontestable. Although
the government has embarked upon a judicial reform program,
ideas alone, however progressive, cannot bring about desired im-
307. See KrTAw, supra note 304, at 15.
308. See id. at 10.
309. See id. at 10-12.
310. ETH. CONST. art. 81 § 1.
311. Id. § 2.
312. See KITAW, supra note 304, at 10-12.
313. See id.
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provements. Big picture reforms such as constitutional restruc-
turing accompanied by bottom-up reforms that seek to improve
the judiciary's infrastructure, disseminate relevant laws to the ju-
diciary, and address the low salaries of judges would help in
strengthening the judiciary and improving its ability to conduct
judicial review.
